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BENIGN SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS
BY ATTORNEYS
I. INTRODUCTION
The companion cases of In re Primus' and Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Association2 reflect the United States Supreme Court's latest
views on the propriety of solicitation of clients by attorneys. The cases
presented fact situations at the opposite ends of the solicitation spec-
trum: Primus dealt with solicitation by a civil rights attorney for pur-
poses of political expression, whereas Ohralik was characterized as a
classic example of "ambulance-chasing."'3 While the two cases will be
helpful in predicting the outcome of solicitation cases involving civil
liberties activity and ambulance:chasing, they provide little guidance
for determining the outcome of cases between those polar extremes.
Justice Marshall wrote an important concurring opinion to these
companion cases4 which focused on the question of the legality of so-
licitation falling between the poles5 of Primus and Ohralik. Justice
Marshall was particularly concerned with providing protection for be-
nign commercial solicitation, which he defined as follows:
By "benign" commercial solicitation, I mean solicitation by advice
and information that is truthful and that is presented in a noncoercive,
nondeceitful, and dignified manner to a potential client who is emo-
tionally and physically capable of making a rational decision either to
accept or reject the representation with respect to a legal claim or mat-
ter that is not frivolous.6
Justice Marshall contended that because of the significant benefits
that can accrue to society from benign solicitation, such activity
should not be stifled with a sweeping nonsolicitation rule.7
The Court has never been presented with a case of benign commer-
cial solicitation, and Justice Marshall's concurrence raises the ques-
tion whether the Court would protect such activity. The issue is par-
1. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
2. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
3. Id. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring). See generally Comment, Legal Ethics-
Ambulance Chasing, 30 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 182 (1955).
4. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468.
5. Id. at 471 (Justice Marshall referred to the fact that the two situations in Primus
and Ohralik were at "opposite poles" of the problem of attorney solicitation).
6. Id. at 472 n.3.
7. Id.at473-74.
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ticularly important because benign commercial solicitation is
currently prohibited by the American Bar Association's Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility (ABA Code).8 If Justice Marshall's position
were ultimately adopted, Canon 2 of the ABA Code would have to be
rewritten.
While Ohralik leaves the current nonsolicitation rule intact, the
Court showed new willingness to inquire into the circumstances sur-
rounding the solicitation activity. 9 This willingness, combined with
Justice Marshall's incisive concurrence, suggests that the Court, when
directly confronted with the question of the extent to which benign
commercial solicitation can constitutionally be restricted, might af-
ford greater protection to such solicitation than would be expected
under the ABA Disciplinary Rules and traditional court doctrine.
That possibility is heightened by recent state court decisions which re-
veal that some state courts are avoiding the broad nonsolicitation rule
in benign solicitation cases in order to prevent harsh outcomes.10
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the social benefits of-
fered by benign commercial solicitation, examine the weaknesses in
the current ABA rules and court doctrine, and suggest arguments t'
that could be presented to persuade a court to abandon the traditional
doctrine and provide protection for such solicitation. An alternative
approach is presented which suggests dealing with solicitation cases
by applying a "circumstances" oriented test. The suggested test would
avoid some of the infirmities of the present doctrine and would be
more useful in predicting outcomes of such cases.
8. ABA CODE, DR 2-103(A) & 2-104(A)(1)-(5); see notes 13-15 and accompanying
text infra.
9. The Court in Ohralik stated, "We agree that the appropriate focus is on appel-
lant's conduct." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 463.
10. For a discussion of these avoidance techniques, see notes 62-65 and accompa-
nying text infra.
1I. All of the major arguments against the present nonsolicitation rule are pre-
sented in Part III infra except the argument that the rule is based on an outmoded
model of a small, homogeneous community which has no bearing on today's diverse ur-
ban society. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 475 (Marshall, J., concurring). The outmoded-
model argument is not developed in this comment because of the Ohralik majority's
view that "[t] he fact that the original motivation behind the ban on solicitation today
might be considered an insufficient justification for its perpetuation does not detract
from the force of the other interests the ban continues to serve." Id. at 460.
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II. THE PRESENT ABA RULES AND COURT DOCTRINE
A. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
Traditionally, solicitation of clients by attorneys has been forbid-
den, 12 and that rule is continued in the Disciplinary Rules of the ABA
Code. 13 For example, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-103(A) prohibits an
attorney from recommending employment of himself to a layperson
who has not sought out his legal advice. 14 In addition, DR 2-104(A)
provides as a general rule that if an attorney does give unsolicited le-
gal advice to a layperson, then the attorney shall not accept any offer
of employment resulting from that advice. 15 The ABA Code lists five
exceptions to this prohibition, one allowing an attorney to accept em-
12. See, e.g., H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210-15 (1953). See also Note, Advertis-
ing, Solicitation, and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REv. 677 (1954).
13. The ABA Code consists of three separate but interrelated parts: the Canons are
statements of axiomatic norms, the Ethical Considerations are aspirational in nature,
and the Disciplinary Rules are mandatory and regulatory. Any attorney whose conduct
violates a Disciplinary Rule is subject to disciplinary action by the bar. Preliminary
Statement, ABA CODE.
14. "A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-101(B), recommend employ-
ment as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a layperson who
has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." ABA CODE, DR 2-103 (A).
15. The Disciplinary Rule provides:
A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that he should
obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that
advice, except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former client
(if the advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the law-
yer reasonably believes to be a client.
(2) A lawyer may accept employment that results from his participation in ac-
tivities designed to educate laypersons to recognize legal problems, to make
intelligent selection of counsel, or to utilize available legal services if such
activities are conducted or sponsored by a qualified legal assistance organi-
zation.
(3) A lawyer who is recommended, furnished or paid by a qualified legal assis-
tance organization enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1) through (4) may repre-
sent a member or beneficiary thereof, to the extent and under the conditions
prescribed therein.
(4) Without affecting his right to accept employment, a lawyer may speak
publicly or write for publication on legal topics so long as he does not em-
phasize his own professional experience or reputation and does not under-
take to give individual advice.
(5) If success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the na-
ture of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may
accept, but shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose
of obtaining their joinder.
ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A)(1)-(5) [footnotes omitted].
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ployment offers that result from activities conducted by a qualified le-
gal assistance organization to educate laypersons to recognize legal
problems 16 and another allowing an attorney who is affiliated with a
qualified legal service organization to solicit clients who are members
or beneficiaries of such groups. 17 The ABA Code does not, however,
carve out an exception for the type of benign solicitation to which
Justice Marshall alluded.
B. Current Court Doctrine
A part of the judicial doctrine which supplements the current bar
rules can be seen in the Primus and Ohralik decisions. Primus in-
volved an attorney who, while affiliated with the American Civil Li-
berties Union, wrote a letter to a woman who had attended a briefing
presented by the attorney. The purpose of the briefing was to inform
certain welfare recipients about their legal rights regarding a steriliza-
tion program instituted as a condition of continued receipt of medical
assistance. In Primus' letter to the woman, she offered the free legal
services of the ACLU if the woman wished to file suit. The South
Carolina Bar Association charged that Primus' letter constituted "so-
licitation in violation of the [state's] Canons of Ethics."18 Primus was
found guilty as charged and was publicly reprimanded. The United
States Supreme Court reversed, holding that Primus' activity was pro-
tected by the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution as a form of political expression and an exercise of asso-
ciational freedom.' 9
Primus is the most recent in a series of Supreme Court cases that
protect solicitation undertaken in the context of "freedom of associa-
tion." The case which established the solicitation-under-group-aus-
pices exception to the general rule proscribing solicitation was
NAACP v. Button,20 in which the Court struck down a Virginia stat-
ute that would have had the effect of preventing the NAACP and its
attorneys from soliciting lawsuits based on allegations of racial dis-
crimination. Noting that the NAACP's purpose in bringing litigation
was to achieve "the lawful objectives of equality of treatment of all
government [agencies] ... for the members of the Negro community
16. ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A)(2), reproduced in note 15 supra.
17. ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A)(3), reproduced in note 15 supra.
18. 436 U.S. at 417.
19. Id. at 439.
20. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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in this country,"21 the Court held that the Virginia statute unconstitu-
tionally restricted the NAACP's political expression and freedom of
association. 22 The associational freedom holding of Button was cited,
in three subsequent cases, as authority for protecting the practice of
labor unions of referring union members to selected attorneys. 23 Al-
though these cases all involved challenges to the unions' and not the
attorneys' practices, the Court in Primus cited them as though their
reasoning applied equally to attorney solicitation challenges. 24 Thus,
the Court in Primus clearly suggested that the associational rights of
the group for which an attorney is working must be considered in de-
termining whether that attorney's solicitation activities may be pro-
scribed.
In contrast to the Primus setting, Ohralik presented a classic "am-
bulance-chasing" situation.25 Attorney Ohralik solicited contingent
fee arrangements from two 18-year-old women who were involved in
an automobile accident. Ohralik approached one of the women while
she was still in traction in her hospital bed, and he approached the
second woman shortly after her discharge from the hospital. Ohralik
recorded conversations with one of the women without her knowl-
edge, and later used the tape to threaten her with suit for his fee when
the woman attempted to discharge him. The Ohio Supreme Court sus-
pended Ohralik from practice indefinitely for his conduct, and the
United States Supreme Court affirmed.
The distinction drawn by the Court in these solicitation cases is
that solicitation of clients for personal gain is subject to state prohibi-
tion, whereas solicitation of clients by attorneys who are asserting po-
litical rights under the auspices of a group in the freedom of associa-
tion context is protected by the first amendment.26
2 1. ld. at 429.
22. Id. at 437.
23. United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 581-83 (1971) (labor union
practice of referring its members to certain selected attorneys for assistance in filing
personal injury claims held protected as an exercise of freedom of association under-
taken to obtain meaningful access to courts); UMW Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (labor union's right to hire attorney on a salary basis to assist
its members in filing workmen's compensation claims held protected against charge of
unauthorized practice of law as a proper exercise of associational freedom); Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (union practice of
recommending specific lawyers to injured workmen held protected against state bar
allegation of unauthorized practice of law and improper solicitation of legal business,
such activity being protected by first and fourteenth amendments).
24. 436 U.S. at 426.
25. 436 U.S. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring). See generally Comment, supra
note 3.
26. E.g., Primus, 436 U.S. at 434. The allowable scope of state regulation is also de-
675
Washington Law Review
C. Application of the Current Court Doctrine to Benign Solicitation
The United States Supreme Court has not yet been presented with a
case of benign commercial solicitation. It is unclear how such a case
would be decided.27 If the Court focused on the motive of the
soliciting attorney and the commercial nature of the speech, as in
Ohralik,28 it is likely that the ABA Code would be upheld and benign
solicitation would go unprotected. On the other hand, if the Court
chose to focus on the benign circumstances surrounding the solicita-
pendent upon the classification of the solicitation. In-person solicitation of clients for
personal gain may be restricted with a prophylactic rule, Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467,
whereas solicitation in furtherance of freedom of association and political expression
may be regulated only upon a showing of actual misconduct by the attorney, Primus
436 U.S. at 434.
27. The outcome of a benign solicitation case is not clear because much of the
Court's analysis in Ohralik revolved around the motive of Ohralik and the characteriza-
tion of his speech. 436 U.S. at 455-58, 464, 467. On the other hand, there are several in-
dications that the Court might choose to place its primary focus on the circumstances
surrounding the solicitation. If the Court did so, the result would favor protection of the
benign solicitation.
The first indication of the Court's willingness to focus on the circumstances is the
characterization of Ohralik's conduct as "in-person" solicitation. Id. at 454-55, 457-
58, 466, 468. The Court used the in-person circumstance to distinguish the solicitation
in Ohralik from that in Primus. Primus, 436 U.S. at 422. Additionally, the Court distin-
guished Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state bar association rule proscribing
advertising by attorneys held unconstitutional), from Ohralik by focusing on the cir-
cumstances of Ohralik's solicitation, Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-56.
Perhaps the strongest indication of the Court's willingness to place primary focus on
the circumstances is the statement: "We agree that the appropriate focus is on [Ohra-
lik's] conduct." Id. at 463. The Court then proceeded to examine the nature of Ohralik's
conduct, placing particular emphasis on the potential for harm associated with direct,
in-person circumstances. Id. at 464-66, 468. The Court concluded that the State was
justified in "prohibiting solicitation in circumstances" where it is likely to result in harm
to the client. Id. at 468 (emphasis added). Justice Rehnquist, while disagreeing with the
Primus majority as to the nature of the circumstances surrounding attorney Primus' sol-
icitation, also displayed a willingness to consider the circumstances: "I believe that con-
stitutional inquiry must focus on the character of the conduct which the State seeks to
regulate, and not on the motives of the individual lawyers or the nature of the particular
litigation involved." Primus, 436 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Finally, the Court made particular reference to the benign nature of the circum-
stances surrounding the solicitation by attorney Primus, noting that her solicitation was
unlikely to create harmful consequences. Id. at 435-36. It is precisely this focus on cir-
cumstances in a case of benign commercial solicitation that would result in a decision
protecting such activity.
28. 436 U.S. at 455-56 (discussion of commercial nature of the speech) & 458-59
(Court noted that Ohralik's speech was not political expression or an exercise of
associational freedom, but rather was an attempt to procure remunerative employ-
ment). See also id. at 462-63 n.20 (Court observed that the Disciplinary Rules proscrib-
ing solicitation are addressed to the problem of the attorney whose motivation is for pe-
cuniary gain).
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tion, such activity might be protected. There is dictum in Primus to
support such a decision:
The State's special interest in regulating members of a profession it li-
censes, and who serve as officers of its courts, amply justifies the ap-
plication of narrowly drawn rules to proscribe solicitation that in fact
is misleading, overbearing, or involves other features of deception or
improper influence. As we decide today in Ohralik, a State also may
forbid in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under circumstances
likely to result in these evils. 29
This dictum is particularly interesting since the current ABA rules are
not "narrowly drawn" nor do they focus on "circumstances likely to
result" in harm. If they were so drafted, they would permit benign so-
licitation since, by definition, such activity is only undertaken in cir-
cumstances that are "noncoercive, nondeceitful and dignified. '30 The
current broad nonsolicitation rule of the ABA Code does not take the
"circumstances" aspect into consideration at all.31
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST CURRENT DOCTRINE
AND FAVORING PROTECTION OF BENIGN
SOLICITATION
The ABA defends the current rules on grounds that they are de-
signed to protect the layperson from the evils associated with
overreaching, 32 undue influence, invasion of privacy, and the subordi-
nation of the client's legal interests to the attorney's financial self-in-
terest. 33 Nevertheless, the current rules have been heavily criticized by
commentators primarily on the grounds that those same evils can be
29. 436 U.S. at 438-39. See also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449 ("the State ...
constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary
gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent").
30. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
3 1. See ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A), reproduced in note 15 supra. The nonsolicitation
rule does not apply if the soliciting attorney qualifies under one of the five exceptions
listed in DR 2-104(A)(l)-(5), see id., but those exceptions do not directly address the
matter of circumstances. There may be an assumption that any solicitation undertaken
within those five exceptions would involve benign circumstances, but the validity of any
such assumption is questionable. An example of a situation when such an assumption
would not be valid is presented and discussed in note 49 and accompanying text infra.
32. "Overreaching" refers to two concepts: solicitation which prevents a free choice
of lawyers due to the aggressive approach of the soliciting attorney, and solicitation
which is offensive to the sensibilities of the client. Comment, A Critical Analysis of
Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. CHi. L. REv. 674, 683 (1958).
33. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461 (ABA justifications for DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-
104(A)).
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curbed by less restrictive rules which would enable society to reap cer-
tain benefits afforded by benign solicitation for commercial gain.34
A. Social Policy Arguments
While the current rules may serve to protect society against certain
harms, they also deprive society of the benefits afforded by benign
solicitation. Some persons with legal problems may fail to seek relief
either because they are unaware that they have a legal problem or
they are unaware of the availability of an adequate legal remedy.35
Since the ABA rules prohibit an attorney from accepting employment
offers arising from unsolicited legal advice, they restrict the free flow
of commercial information which facilitates the proper functioning of
the marketplace by allowing informed decisionmaking by the con-
sumer and efficient allocation of scarce resources.36
Furthermore, as Justice Marshall noted, the current rules discrimi-
nate against the less-privileged members of our society because those
in the middle- and low-income brackets tend to know little about the
law. 37 Additionally, by allowing solicitation under the auspices of "a
qualified legal assistance organization,"3 8 the present rules discrimi-
nate against those laypersons who are not members or beneficiaries of
groups which will protect their legal interests.
Another undesirable social aspect to the current nonsolicitation
doctrine observed by Justice Marshall is that the ABA rules are "dis-
criminatory with respect to the suppliers as well as the consumers of
legal services." 39 The current rules are more burdensome for the solo
practitioner or member of a small partnership than for the attorney
who is a member of a large corporate-oriented firm because the latter
34. See, e.g., Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Re-
draft of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183
(1976); Comment, note 32 supra; Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's
Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181 (1972).
35. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 473 (Marshall, J., concurring). The decision in Bates v.
State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), see note 57 infra, does nothing to help someone in this
category since advertising is of assistance only to one who is aware that he has a legal
problem which could be addressed by the type of legal service being advertised.
36. Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) (state statute which unconstitutionally proscribed adver-
tising of drug prices restricted free flow of commercial information).
37. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 474-75 (Marshall, J., concurring). See generally B. CHRIS-
TENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 128-34 (1970).
38. See ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A)(3), reproduced in note 15 supra.
39. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 475-76 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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does not need to solicit in order to attract business.40 The solo practi-
tioner, on the other hand, especially one commencing practice, faces
a formidable task in trying to build up a clientele.41
A final shortcoming of the rules concerns the extent to which they
impede certain types of public interest lawsuits. 42 The group excep-
tion to the nonsolicitation rule is an excellent vehicle for the vindica-
tion of certain social goals when the potential plaintiff is a member or
beneficiary of a qualified group, as demonstrated by the protection
afforded the NAACP and ACLU in suits brought to eliminate racial
discrimination and protect civil liberties. 43 Unfortunately, not every
potential plaintiff whose legal claim has strong public interest over-
tones is going to be a member or beneficiary of a "qualified" group. It
may be, however, that the particular social value can best be pursued
through a class action suit. If so, then the current rules operate di-
rectly to stifle the vindication of that social concern since DR 2-
104(A)(5) expressly forbids solicitation in class action suits. 44
B. Doctrinal Weaknesses of the Current Nonsolicitation Rule
1. Motive distinction
In deciding whether to protect solicitation of clients, courts com-
monly draw distinctions based on the motive of the attorney who at-
tempts the solicitation. 45 If the attorney's motive for the solicitation is
commercial gain, then the solicitation is subject to state proscrip-
40. See id. and authorities cited therein.
41. This discrimination between attorneys resulting from the group exception to the
nonsolicitation rule is explored further under the equal protection analysis in Part III-
C infra.
42. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the notion that instigating litiga-
tion is inherently evil. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375-76 (1977). "[W] e cannot
accept the notion that it is always better for a person to suffer a wrong silently than to
redress it by legal action." Id. at 376.
43. The ABA rules say nothing about an interest in the elimination of racial dis-
crimination as such, but the effect of DR 2-104(A)(3), reproduced in note 15 supra, is to
extend protection to groups such as the NAACP and the ACLU which frequently bring
suit in discrimination and civil liberties cases. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 427-28 (Court
noted that ACLU only entered cases in which substantial civil liberties questions were
involved); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (NAACP solicitation of cases
involving racial discrimination).
44. ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A)(5), reproduced in note 15 supra.
45. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 422; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462-63 n.20 (Court notes that
improper solicitation has historically been defined in terms of the attorney's pecuniary
motive).
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tion;46 whereas, if the attorney's motivation is political expression or
the furtherance of associational freedom, then the solicitation may be
protected.47
Using motive to determine which solicitation to protect and which
to punish is defective for two reasons. First, an inquiry into motive
does not address those substantive evils against which the rules are in-
tended to protect.48 The same dangers of overreaching and undue in-
fluence will be present in a situation when the attorney's motivation
for political expression is so intense and overzealous that the client's
interests are trampled by the attorney in his desire to bring suit.49 Sec-
ond, motive is often difficult to ascertain "and it is subject to manipu-
lation by clever practitioners." 50
2. Commercial speech distinction
In addition to making distinctions based on the motive of the soli-
citing attorney, the courts also look to the nature of the speech to
determine the extent to which they will protect the solicitation. Solici-
tation which is characterized as political expression or an exercise of
associational freedom is protected 5' to a greater degree than is "com-
mercial speech.152
The commercial speech doctrine was originally announced in 1942
in Valentine v. Chrestensen53 when, without citing any authority for
its distinction, the Supreme Court denied first amendment protection
46. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464.
47. See notes 19-24 and accompanying text supra.
48. As Justice Marshall observed, "What is objectionable about Ohralik's behavior
here is not so much that he solicited business for himself, but rather the circumstances in
which he performed that solicitation and the means by which he accomplished it." 436
U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring).
49. Justice Rehnquist made particular note of this deficiency in the majority opin-
ion:
A State may reasonably fear that a lawyer's desire to resolve "substantial civil lib-
erties questions." ... may occasionally take precedence over his duty to advance
the interests of his client. It is even more reasonable to fear that a lawyer in such
circumstances will be inclined to pursue both culpable and blameless defendants to
the last ditch in order to achieve his ideological goals.
Primus, 436 U.S. at 445 -46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
50. Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Primus majority opinion concedes the
difficulty of making distinctions which turn on the motive of the soliciting attorney.
"The line, based in part on the motive of the speaker and the character of the expressive
activity, will not always be easy to draw .... 436 U.S. at 438 n.32.
51. See notes 19-24 and accompanying text supra.
52. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455-59.
53. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
680
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to an advertising handbill because it was "purely commercial advertis-
ing.15 4 The commercial speech doctrine has been seriously eroded in
such recent Supreme Court cases as Bigelow v. Virginia,55 Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,56 and Bates v. State Bar,57 and heavily attacked in the commen-
taries. 58 Its continued viability is very much in question. 59 A court's
decision not to protect solicitation rests on unstable grounds to the ex-
tent such decision is based on the severely eroded commercial speech
doctrine.
3. Limitations on predictability
One of the desirable goals of any legal doctrine is to provide a reli-
able touchstone for predicting the outcome of any given legal issue.
Unfortunately, the current nonsolicitation doctrine, encumbered as it
is with the "motive" test and the commercial speech distinction, is of
little use in predicting the outcome of a solicitation case that does not
fall at or near the poles delineated by Primus and Ohralik. Justice
Rehnquist, noting these difficulties, observed, "I do not believe that
any State will be able to determine with confidence the area in which
it may regulate prophylactically [as in the Ohralik setting] and the
area in which it may regulate only upon a specific showing of harm
[as in the Primus context] ."60
54. Id. at 54.
55. 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (state statute invoked against newspaper editor who pub-
lished an advertisement dealing with abortion services held unconstitutional, notwith-
standing commercial nature of the advertisement).
56. 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (state statute proscribing advertising of drug prices held
unconstitutional and contention that advertising is outside of first amendment because
of commercial nature rejected).
57. 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (state bar association rule proscribing advertising by attor-
neys held unconstitutional as violative of first amendment).
58. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 70, 205-08 (1977);
Comment, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: A Consumers' Rights Interpretation of the
First Amendment Ends Bans on Legal Advertising, 55 DEN. LJ. 103, 106-07 (1978);
Comment, Solicitation by the Second Oldest Profession: Attorneys and Advertising, 8
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 77, 88-89 (1973).
59. As early as 1959, Justice Douglas viewed the ruling that established the com-
mercial speech doctrine as "casual, almost offhand. And it has not survived reflection."
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
60. Primus, 436 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, viewing
the impact of the majority opinion, expressed his dissatisfaction with the predictability
aspect: "I for one, am not now able to delineate in the area of political solicitation the
extent of state authority to proscribe misleading statements." Id. at 439 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
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Under the current nonsolicitation doctrine, one is left to speculate,
for example, on the outcome of a case in which an attorney engages in
solicitation out of the dual motives of political expression and com-
mercial gain. The current doctrine proves to be of little use since po-
litical expression is protected by Primus, whereas solicitation for pur-
poses of commercial gain is prohibited by Ohralik. The current
doctrine gives no guidance for determining at what point one distinc-
tion should give way to the other. 61
4. Contemporary responses by the judiciary-avoidance techniques
Historically, when a rule of law promulgated for a valid public pol-
icy reason has operated in a harsh and unfair manner in circum-
stances unrelated to the original evil contemplated by the rule, the
courts have either struck down the old rule62 or have employed vari-
ous ingenious judicial techniques to avoid the harshness of the rule. 63
Presently some courts are involved in just such judicial avoidance
techniques in an effort to avoid the harshness of the current Discipli-
nary Rules in cases of benign solicitation. For example, California has
devised a "primary purpose" test whereby an attorney accused of so-
licitation cannot be punished under the nonsolicitation rules unless the
solicitation "viewed in its entirety . . .serves no discernible purpose
other than the attraction of clients."64 Kentucky has developed a
transformation technique which changes otherwise proscribed solici-
tation into protected advertising. Kentucky recently performed this
feat of metamorphosis in behalf of two enterprising attorneys who
61. The political versus commercial distinction can be drawn not only with regard
to the motive of the soliciting attorney, but with regard to the nature of the speech as
well. For example, an attorney who solicited the business of a black man who had been
denied employment because of racial discrimination might do so because of a political
motive, but the offer to represent him in a suit for lost wages for a one-third contingent
fee is speech that proposes a commercial transaction.
62. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858 (1975) (common law rule of contributory negligence superseded by new doctrine of
comparative negligence).
63. For example, the last clear chance doctrine was created to avoid the harshness of
the common law rule of contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery in a ne-
gligence suit. See Cavanaugh v. Boston & Me. R.R., 76 N.H. 68, 79 A. 694 (1911).
64. Jacoby v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 3d 359, 371, 562 P.2d 1326, 1334, 138 Cal. Rptr.
77, 85 (1977) (attorneys' conduct in engaging in media interviews held protected
against charges of solicitation of clients). The California primary purpose rule, while
helpful in ameliorating the harshness of the current nonsolicitation doctrine, is unsatis-
factory because it still places the focus on motive and not on those circumstances sur-
rounding the solicitation which may pose the actual risk of harm.
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wrote letters to real estate agencies offering to prepare title searches,
deeds, and mortgages. The Kentucky Bar Association, which had sat-
isfied itself that the letters constituted solicitation, was informed by
the court that the letters were really just advertising.6 5
It is an unfortunate comment on the current rules and doctrine that
some courts feel the necessity of engaging in such avoidance tech-
niques. 66 A well-drafted rule that properly serves the interests of soci-
ety would obviate this need and encourage analysis which directly
seeks a just result.
C. Equal Protection Challenge to the ABA Rules
Not only are there numerous social and doctrinal shortcomings to
the current prohibition against solicitation, but the ABA Code Disci-
plinary Rules are susceptible to an equal protection challenge under
65. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978) (per curiam).
The Kentucky transformation rule, while helpful in diluting the harshness of the current
nonsolicitation rule, is unsatisfactory. One can envision situations in which the court
will have to draw spurious distinctions in order to protect benign solicitation as "ad-
vertising." Black's Law Dictionary defines "advertise" as: "To give notice to, inform or
notify, give public notice of, announce publicly, notice or observe." BLACK'S LAw Dic-
nONARY 74 (4th rev. ed. 1968). "Solicit" is defined as: "To appeal for something ....
The term implies a personal petition and importunity addressed to a particular
individual to do some particular thing." Id. at 1564.
Kentucky has a history of approaching the issue of benign commercial solicitation
with refreshing candor:
There are many forms of solicitation. Some lawyers seek business by advertising
in the newspapers; others by sending out announcement cards; others by asking
their friends to send them business; others by applying directly, or through the me-
dium of friends, for employment by firms and corporations; others buy stock in
corporations with the understanding that they are to be employed as counsel; still
others invite to their homes and frequently entertain those who are likely to require
the services of an attorney .... Manifestly, if every kind of solicitation, regardless
of the form it may take, is to be condemned, then only in rare instances would there
be such a thing as a valid contract of employment between a lawyer and his client.
If some forms are to be permitted, while others are to be condemned, where shall
the line be drawn?
Chreste v. Louisville Ry. Co., 167 Ky. 75, 83-84, 180 S.W. 49, 53 (1915) (contract ob-
tained by solicitation held valid as not against public policy). See also Louisville Bar
Ass'n v. Hubbard, 282 Ky. 734, 139 S.W.2d 773, 775 (1940).
66. Not all state courts conclude that benign commercial solicitation should be pro-
tected. In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, the petitioners, who were attorneys
in a professional law corporation, formed a legal group to provide prepaid legal serv-
ices to selected employee groups. Petitioners mailed letters to certain employers de-
scribing the services offered and enclosed a brochure designed for the education of the
employees. Under the proposed group plan, the employer agreed to withhold $ 10.00 per
month from the wages of each covered employee and remit such sum to the attorneys,
who agreed to perform legal services specified in detail in the brochure.
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the fourteenth amendment. 67 The general nonsolicitation rule is ex-
pressed by DR 2-103(A)68 and DR 2-104(A).6 9 In DR 2-104(A)(3)
an exception to the general prohibition is provided for an attorney
"who is recommended, furnished or paid by a qualified legal assis-
tance organization. '70 An attorney so affiliated may solicit clients
who are members or beneficiaries of such groups. 71 Of course, the
"members or beneficiaries" of a qualified legal assistance organization
such as a legal aid office or public defender office72 include the gen-
eral public. Thus, two classifications of attorneys are established:
those who are affiliated with a qualified group and those who are not.
Attorneys in the former class receive favored treatment denied to
those of the latter. An attorney affiliated with a qualified group may
engage in solicitation under the protection of DR 2-104(A)(3), but an
attorney not affiliated with such an organization remains subject to
the rigors of the nonsolicitation rule.
The classification scheme established by the ABA Code, with its
Notwithstanding the benign nature of the solicitation, see text accompanying note 6
supra, the Louisiana State Bar Association notified petitioners that they were being in-
vestigated for potential violations of DR 2-103. The petitioners sought an injunction
against the bar association, claiming that the disciplinary rules were unconstitutional.
The court rejected their claim. Drawing upon language from Primus and Ohralik, the
court concluded that the letters written by the petitioners, although not face-to-face soli-
citation, were nevertheless "direct solicitation," and were thus proscribed by Ohralik.
Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489, 496 (La. 1978). Focusing also on
the motive involved, the court rejected petitioners' claim that they were simply trying to
provide legal services at a reasonable cost to those who otherwise might not have such
service, and instead concluded that "financial benefits for petitioners is [sic] at least an
important motive for the solicitation." Id. The court continued:
Since we interpret petitioners' actions as direct solicitation for pecuniary gain, and
since we find the State's traditional and important regulation of the practice of law
by prohibiting solicitation would have no adverse impact upon constitutional rights
(except the lawyer's own right to speak as he pleases in commercial solicitation) the
prohibition against direct solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain will be upheld.
Id.
The court did not discuss why the petitioners' group did not qualify as a "qualified"
legal assistance organization within the meaning of the group exception to the nonsolici-
tation rule. Presumably, petitioners' group did not qualify because, contrary to the re-
quirements of DR 2-103(D)(4)(a)-(b), the group was organized and operated by the pe-
titioners to make a profit.
67. The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part: "No State shall ... deny
tb any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
68. ABA CODE, DR 2-103(A), reproduced in note 14 supra.
69. ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A), reproduced in note 15 supra.
70. ABA CODE, DR 2-104(A)(3), reproduced in note 15 supra.
71. Id. For an enumeration of qualifying organizations, see ABA CODE, DR 2-
103(D)(l)-(4).
72. ABA CODE, DR 2-103(D)(1).
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differing treatment of attorneys, can be illustrated by means of a hy-
pothetical based on facts similar to those in Primus. Attorney A is em-
ployed by the ACLU but, unlike Primus, A's employment contract
provides that she will receive part of her salary from court-awarded
fees.73 Attorney A, motivated by a desire to receive a court-awarded
fee, has a meeting74 with a low-income woman who has been steril-
ized by a local doctor as a condition of continued receipt of Medicaid
payments. During the meeting attorney A encourages the woman to
sue the doctor, and offers the free legal services of the ACLU for such
a suit. The woman agrees to sue and asks attorney A to represent her.
Attorney A accepts the offer and subseqently files suit.
Attorney B, on the other hand, is in private practice. Motivated by
a desire for commercial gain, attorney B has a similar meeting with
such a woman. Attorney B offers to represent the woman in hope of
securing an award of attorney's fees. The woman agrees to sue, asks
attorney B to represent her, and attorney B accepts the offer.
Attorney A is protected in her solicitation and can accept the cli-
ent's offer of employment pursuant to DR 2-104(3) because he is af-
filiated with a qualified legal service organization as enumerated in
DR 2-103(D)(1) through (4). This is so notwithstanding attorney A's
pecuniary motive for soliciting the client since motive is not a factor
in the operation of the Disciplinary Rules. However, attorney B has
violated DR 2-104(A) of the ABA Code and is subject to disciplinary
action, including possible indefinite suspension.75 The two hypotheti-
cal attorneys have engaged in substantially similar conduct arising
from identical motives, yet they receive radically different treatment
under the ABA Code by virtue of the exception to the general nonsolic-
itation rule for attorneys affiliated with a "qualified legal assistance
organization."
Under the precedents which establish equal protection doctrine, the
current rules and group solicitation exception neither create a "sus-
73. The Court noted in Primus that the ACLU now allows its local offices to experi-
ment with this method of attorney compensation. 436 U.S. at 430-31 n.24.
74. The presentation of the attorney's unsolicited legal advice in a face-to-face
meeting in this hypothetical, as opposed to solicitation by letter as in Primus, is to in-
sure that the outcome of the hypothetical is not dependent on whether a letter is "in-per-
son" solicitation within the meaning of DR 2-104(A). This issue was the basis of a suc-
cessful defense in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978) (per
curiam). See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
75. An attorney who violates a Disciplinary Rule is subject to disciplinary action.
Preliminary Statement, ABA CODE. Attorney Ohralik violated DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-
104(A) of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility and was indefinitely suspended
as a result. 436 U.S. at 453-54.
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pect classification" 76 nor infringe on a "fundamental right" 77 and
therefore would not invoke strict judicial scrutiny. The relationship
between the classifications established by the Disciplinary Rules and
the prevention of the harm associated with overreaching and undue
influence is sufficient to satisfy the traditional rational basis test.78
There has been, however, a widely noted trend in Supreme Court doc-
trine away from the application of a rigid two-tiered equal protection
analysis.79 Several aspects of the operation of the solicitation rule and
its group exception suggest that the Court might consider an equal
protection challenge to these rules at a level of scrutiny more exacting
than the deferential rational basis test.
First, the right being directly regulated is the right to commercial
speech. The Ohralik Court found that the defendant's own conduct
could be constitutionally regulated because of the dangers it presented
to society.80 The Court did not apply the overbreadth doctrine 81 and
76. The Court has to date held only the following to be suspect classifications: race.
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S.
633 (1948); and alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
77. In the area of equal protection, the Court has to date held to be fundamental
only those rights which relate to voting, Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections. 383
U.S. 663 (1966); access to the judicial process, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); and interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The Court has
not settled on a technique for identifying fundamental rights. See generally J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 410-19, 674-87 (1978).
78. See 0hralik, 436 U.S. at 461-62. An example of the application of the rational
basis test is McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). For a general discus-
sion of the rational basis test, see Comment, Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077-87 (1969).
79. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: it Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. I, 12, 18-24 (1972). Professor Gunther analyzed fifteen equal protection cases
and concluded that the Burger Court was developing a trend toward equal protection
"bite" without reaching strict scrutiny. Cases which employ such an intermediate doc-
trine without reaching strict scrutiny include Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977)
(gender classification); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (illegitimacy classi-
fication); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (wealth classification); and Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender classification). Justice Marshall has long advocated
use of a "spectrum of standards" which vary with the "constitutional and societal impor-
tance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis
upon which the particular classification is drawn." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice White has observed
that "it is clear that we employ not just one, or two, but, as my brother Marshall has so
ably demonstrated, a 'spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly vi-
olative of the Equal Protection Clause.' " Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973)
(White, J., concurring).
80. 436 U.S. at 467-68.
81. See id. at 462 n.20 (Court noted that an overbreadth argument had not been
made and would not have been successful in any case).
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thus did not consider whether a person in the position of hypothetical
attorney B, whose commercial solicitation was less harmful than
Ohralik's, would-be constitutionally protected from the rule's prohibi-
tion. Even if the nonsolicitation rule does not infringe on attorney B's
interest in commercial speech to such an extent that it violates the first
amendment, it certainly infringes on that interest to a certain degree.
Although such subconstitutional infringement of a constitutionally
protected right has not traditionally occasioned strict scrutiny in an
equal protection context, such infringement would almost certainly,
under a flexible equal protection analysis, affect the level of scrutiny
applied.
A similar argument could be advanced regarding the rule's impact
on attorney B's freedom of association. This right is generally consid-
ered to encompass the freedom not to associate.8 2 The nonsolicitation
rule puts attorney B in a position which requires that she join a quali-
fied group if she wants to engage in benign commercial solicitation.
82. The notion that freedom of association includes the right not to be compelled to
associate against one's wishes is an emerging concept, the full extent of which is as yet
unclear. The Court has held that freedom of association prohibits a state from compel-
ling an individual to associate with a political party as a condition of retaining public
employment, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355-59 (1976). More recently, the Court
held in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233-34 (1977), that the right of
workers to prevent their union from spending a part of their required service fees to
contribute to political candidates and to express political views with which they dis-
agreed was constitutionally protected as an aspect of the right to freedom from com-
pelled association. Additionally, a lower federal court, in a case dealing with compelled
political association, observed, "At the core of the present case is the equally basic prin-
ciple that the right to associate includes the right of affiliation with the political party of
one's choice or the right not to affiliate with a political party at all." Cullen v. New York
State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (county policy of re-
quiring employee contributions to designated political party held actionable under
applicable civil rights statute as violation of freedom of association).
The Court in Abood noted that compelled association, although interfering with first
amendment interests, is constitutionally justified by a legislative assessment of overrid-
ing interest. 431 U.S. at 222. The Court in Elrod observed that such first amendment in-
terests were not absolute, but could be encroached upon "for appropriate reasons." 427
U.S. at 360. Justice Douglas felt that compelled association was constitutionally per-
missible only if the state showed "exceptional circumstances." Lathrop v. Donohue, 367
U.S. 820, 882 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (issue whether dues money of a member
of the bar could constitutionally be used to support causes opposed by such member not
reached by the Court).
In the situation created by the Disciplinary Rule classifications, the freedom from
compelled association is not overcome by any such legislative determination of impor-
tance or a showing of exceptional circumstances. In the absence of such factors, it is un-
likely that the compelled association that arises by implication from the Disciplinary
Rules could be constitutionally sustained.
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Finally, the alternative of drafting a rule which focuses directly on
those evils to be protected against 83 is readily available. 84 Such a rule
could avoid the creation of classifications which discriminate against
attorneys soliciting on their own, and its availability would probably
make the Court more receptive to the equal protection challenge out-
lined above.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The previous section outlined the benefits to society of benign com-
mercial solicitation, together with the infirmities that are present with
the current nonsolicitation doctrine. Several excellent alternatives to
the current rules have been proposed in the commentaries, 85 and even
the ABA's proposed revision of Canon 2 of the ABA Code which was
rejected by the Board of Governors86 offered much in the way of re-
form.87 As noted previously, there is also language in Primus which, if
read literally, would shift the Court's focus away from the irrelevan-
83. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra.
84. See Part IV infra for a discussion of alternative means to protect against the
evils to which the current nonsolicitation rules are addressed.
85. See, e.g., Freedman. Advertising and Solicitation By Lawyers: A Proposed Re-
draft of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183.
198-203 (1976); Comment, Advertising, Solicitation, and the Profession's Dutty to
Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181. 1192-201 (1972). Although these
commentaries reflect suggestions that were adopted in part by the post-Bates revisions
to the ABA Code, the suggestions contained therein relating to solicitation reforms are
still relevant.
86. The ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising, formed in response to the deci-
sion in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). submitted two proposals to the Board of
Governors. The more liberal proposal was termed "Proposal B" and the more restric-
tive, traditional approach was "Proposal A." A BA Code of Professional Responsibility
Amendments, Report to the Board of Governors of the Task Force on Lawyer Advertis-
ing, 46 U.S.L.W. 1, 1-2 (Aug. 23, 1977). Proposal B was rejected by the Board of
Governors, with the recommendation that the Code be amended as provided in Pro-
posal A and that both proposals be circulated to the states. ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility Amnendmnents, Report of the Board of Governors to the House of Dele-
gates Concerning Lawyer Advertising, 46 U.S.L.W. 1. I (Aug. 23, 1977).
87. Although Proposal B, see note 86 supra, purported to continue the traditional
ban on solicitation, it focused on the circumstances of the solicitation:
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layperson that he should ob-
tain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that
advice if:
(1) The advice embodies or implies a statement or claim that is false, fraudulent.
misleading, or deceptive within the meaning of DR 2-101(B); or that violates the
regulations contained in DR 2-101(C); or
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cies of the motive of the soliciting attorney and the characterization of
the speech as "commercial" or "political expression" and focus in-
stead on the circumstances under which the solicitation took place.88
The essence of the suggestions for revision presented by these
sources can be synthesized into the following two-pronged test:
(1) any form of solicitation of clients in which the attorney
communicates information that is false, deceptive, or misleading
is prohibited;8 9 and
(2) solicitation of clients in situations that, to an attorney of
ordinary prudence,90 present a significant risk of undue influ-
ence, invasion of privacy, or overreaching is prohibited.9 1 Any
solicitation undertaken during a period in which the client's
judgment may be expected to be impaired, such as after an acci-
dent involving bodily injury or a funeral, unless a reasonable
time period has transpired to allow for recovery, shall be pre-
sumed to be improper.
The suggested test, by focusing on the circumstances under which
the solicitation takes place, would protect benign commercial solicita-
tion. The motive of the soliciting attorney and the characterization of
the speech as commercial or political would be irrelevant under this
test, and thus many of the difficulties engendered by the current rules
and court doctrine described earlier92 would be avoided.
The suggested test does not present a per se ban against solicitation
merely because it is "in-person." Although in-person solicitation often
(2) The advice involves the use by the lawyer of coercion, duress, compulsion, in-
timidation, threats, unwarranted promises of benefits, overpersuasion, over-
reaching, or vexatious or harassing conduct.
A BA Code of Professional Responsibility Amendments, Report to the Board of Gover-
nors of the Task Force on Lawyer Advertising, 46 U.S.L.W. 1, 12 (Aug. 23, 1977).
88. See text accompanying note 29 supra. Although Justice Rehnquist construed the
circumstances surrounding attorney Primus' solicitation differently than did the major-
ity, he also argued in favor of a circumstances test: "I believe that constitutional inquiry
must focus on the character of the conduct which the State seeks to regulate, and not on
the motives of the individual lawyers or the nature of the particular litigation involyed."
436 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
89. This provision is, in essence, a restatement of the holding in Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977), substituting "solicitation" for "advertising."
90. The proposed test adopts an objective standard, measured by the ethical
judgment of an attorney of ordinary prudence. This idea is presented in Comment, Ad-
vertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81
YALE L.J. 1181, 1199 (1972).
91. These rules would apply, of course, not only to the individual attorney, but also
to the attorney's representatives.
92. See Part III supra.
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involves a serious potential for overreaching,9 3 the proposed rule is
drafted on the assumption that such overreaching is not inevitable and
that this danger can be best protected against by considering the in-
person aspect as one factor in determining whether the circumstances
of the solicitation present a significant risk of harm to the client's in-
terests.
Application of the suggested test would not have produced different
results in Primus or Ohralik. Primus' solicitation of her client did not
take place under circumstances in which the potential client's judg-
ment was impaired, nor did Primus convey false, deceptive, or mis-
leading information. 94 Conversely, attorney Ohralik's solicitation was
improper because, to an attorney of ordinary prudence, the solic-
itation took place under circumstances that represented an unaccept-
able risk of overreaching. 95
The suggested test helps to eliminate the confusion about the out-
come of cases falling "between the poles" of Primus and Ohralik,
primarily because motive is an irrelevant factor in the suggested test.96
93. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457-58, 464-65 (discussion of the increased potential
for harm associated with in-person solicitation).
94. 436 U.S. at 434-36 (Court analysis of Primus' solicitation concludes that there
was no "undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy" and
thus there was no potential for harm to the client).
95. See 436 U.S. at 467-68 (Court's review of the circumstances leads to the con-
clusion that Ohralik's conduct constituted a "striking example of the potential for
overreaching").
96. As an example of the application of the suggested test, consider the following
hypothetical. An attorney in private practice becomes aware that a certain nursing
home is defrauding its elderly patients by diverting a portion of the monthly support
payments paid by the patients into various collateral money-making schemes instead of
spending that money for the services of a registered nurse who is supposed to be avail-
able 24 hours a day according to the patients' contracts. Instead, the registered nurse is
available only during the daytime, while a less expensive and less qualified licensed
practical nurse is on call at night.
The issue presented by this hypothetical is whether the attorney can approach the el-
derly patients under circumstances that are noncoercive, nondeceitful, and dignified
and offer to represent their legal interests. The attorney's purpose of soliciting the busi-
ness is to realize commercial gain.
Under the current rules and doctrine, any attorney who did so solicit, and accept em-
ployment therefrom, would violate DR 2-I04(A) of the ABA Code. See note 15 supra.
The solicitation does not fall within any of the exceptions from the general rule listed in
DR 2-104(A)(1) through (5). See id. Although the hypothetical fact situation falls di-
rectly within Justice Marshall's definition of benign commercial solicitation, the fact
that the solicitation would be in-person and for commercial gain would seem to place
this solicitation within the Ohralik rule, under which it would be improper.
If viewed under the suggested test, however, one reaches the opposite result. Motive
and speech characterization are irrelevant. The inquiry is into the circumstances under
which the solicitation takes place. Since the circumstances of the hypothetical are stated
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To show the greater predictability afforded by the suggested test, it is
instructive to turn to the situations suggested by the Justices them-
selves that would be incapable of ready resolution or would be deter-
mined in an unsatisfactory manner under the current doctrine.
Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent in Primus, described a hypotheti-
cal in which an attorney was so intent on resolving substantial civil
liberties questions that he allowed his zeal to take precedence over the
interests of a client.97 Justice Rehnquist argued that under the major-
ity's doctrine, such conduct might not be prohibited. Under the sug-
gested test, if such an attorney pursued an unwilling client to the point
that the attorney became an unwanted nuisance, the attorney's solici-
tation would be proscribed by the second prong as a case of
unacceptable overreaching.
The majority opinion in Primus left lingering doubt about the out-
come of a case in which an attorney had solicited a client out of dual
motives, for purposes of both political expression and commercial
gain. 98 The answer to this hypothetical cannot be determined under
the suggested test without knowing the circumstances under which the
solicitation took place, but suffice it to say that since motive is irrele-
vant under the suggested test and the "circumstances" aspect is to be
viewed under objective criterion, the task of resolving the question is
easier and the outcome more predictable.
As well as protecting much socially valuable conduct and produc-
ing more predictable results, the suggested test also avoids the equal
protection issue discussed earlier.99
An obvious criticism of the suggested test is that it gives the courts
very little guidance for application in particular cases. It would re-
quire many cases and much judicial gloss to determine exactly how
the test applies to particular situations. The suggested test is not
meant to be an ultimate solution to the problem of deciding solicita-
tion cases, but rather is intended to serve as a touchstone for needed
revisions of the ABA Code. If the ABA revises the current Code, par-
ticularly DR 2-103100 and DR 2-104,101 in keeping with the spirit of
to be noncoercive, nondeceitful, and dignified, the solicitation is protected by the sug-
gested test. There is no need for any type of judicial avoidance technique to achieve
what intuitively seems to be a just result.
97. 436 U.S. at 445-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 430-31 n.24, 436 n.30. The majority in Primus acknowledged that the
dual motive dilemma was left unanswered.
99. See Part III-C supra.
100. Relevant portions are reproduced in note 14 supra.
101. Relevant portions are reproduced in note 15 supra.
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the suggested test, then the benign commercial solicitation problem
will be resolved. In the absence of such a rewriting, however, the
courts could, nonetheless, revise the existing rules on a case-by-case
basis guided by the two prongs of the suggested test.
V. CONCLUSION
There are numerous social policy arguments that favor protection
of benign commercial solicitation of clients by attorneys which, when
taken together with the doctrinal and constitutional infirmities of the
current nonsolicitation doctrine, present a compelling case for revi-
sion of both the ABA Code and current court doctrine. Ideally, this
change should come from the ABA. President Carter recently re-
marked before the California bar:
One of the greatest failings of the organized bar in the past century
since the American Bar Association was founded is that it has fought
innovations. When greater competition has come to the legal profes-
sion .... when lawyers have begun to advertise or compete-in short,
when the profession has accommodated the interests of the public-it
has done so only when forced to.102
Should President Carter's criticism prove again to be true, and the or-
ganized bar fail to adopt the needed reform, the courts should take
the initiative and jettison the current rules and doctrine with their
many infirmities and adopt in their place the suggested two-pronged
test which shifts the focus away from the motive of the soliciting attor-
ney and the characterization of the speech as commercial or political
expression and focuses instead on the circumstances of the solicita-
tion.
Joe Wishcamper
102. President Carter's Attack on Lawyers, President Spann's Response, and Chief
Justice Burger's Remarks, 64 A.B.A.J. 840, 845 (1978) (text of President Carter's
speech).
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